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THE PROPOSED DEFENSE OF -INDIGENTS
ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. TFXT OF THE PROP0SED ACT
Section 1. When a person is charged with a crime, he shall be
ddvised that he is entitled to counsel if not" already represented.
If such person is charged with a crime for which a sentence of
six (6) months or more may be imposed, he may request counsel.
If counsel is requested and it is determined that the accused is
financially unable to obtain an adequate defeiise, counsel shall
lie assigned to represent him as provided hereafter. A person
financially unable to employ counsel who is charged with a crime
for which a sentence of less than six (6) months may be imposed
may also apply to have counsel assigned to represent him, and,
if in the opinion of the Judge, such appointment is warranted,
counsel shall be assigned to represent such person. Any Circuit
Judge shall, in his discretion, appoint counsel for an indigent
dbfendant in any case even though no application is made to him,
if, in his opinion, such assignment is warranted to protect the
rights of such defendant.
Section 2. A person who applies to have counsel assigned to
represent him shall sign under oath an Affidavit that he is finan-
cially unable to obtain an adequate defense and that he is without
sufficient funds to employ counsel. Such person shall list on the
apliication such assets as he owns. The application to have
counsel assigned and the Affidavit shall be substantially as set
out in Form No. 1. If a person has some assets available to pay
counsel but such assets are not sufficient to employ private coun-
sel, such assets as the' applicant can pay will be paid to the ad-
ministrator and assigned counsel will be provided.
Section 3a. There is hereby'created a'claim against the assets
and estate of a person who is provided a defense under this act,
in an amount equal to the cost of the defense as determined pur-
suant to Sections 6 and 9 of this Act, less such amount which the
defendant paid on his defense.
Section 3b. Such claim shall be filed in the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the County where the defendant was assigned
counsel, but the filing of a claim does not constitute a lien against
the real or personal property of the defendant unless such claim
is reduced to judgment by giving the defendant 30 days notice
1
et al.: The Proposed Defense of Indigents Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
1966] TMa PROPOSED Dm;Fws OF LNio -Ts AcT 381
that a judgment will be filed. When a claim is reduced to a judg-
ment, it shall have the same effect as judgments generally, except
as modified by this Act.
Section 3. The claim and judgment provided for in subsec-
tion (a) above shall include the garnishment of wages in excess
of the amount necessary to provide for the necessities of life for
the defendant and his dependents, as established by the Court
according to guidelines provided for by the Supreme Court.
Section 3d. The claim created in subsection (a) above shall
be subject to the Homestead Exemption as provided for in S. C.
CODE ANN. § 34-1 to -14 (1962). The Court may, in its discretion
for good cause, provide in any case, by Order, that the claim or
judgment provided for in subsection (a) above be waived, modi-
fied or withdrawn.
Section 3e. The claim provided for in subsection (a) above
shall be good for a period of 10 years. The Attorney General
shall be responsible for administering this Section. All monies
collected under this section shall be paid to the State for the
benefit of the program established by this Act.
Section 4. A defendant may waive the right to have counsel
appointed in any case except a capital felony, if such waiver is
voluntarily and understandably made, by the execution of a
written waiver.
Section 5. A defendant with or without counsel may plead
guilty but the trial judge shall inform the accused of the nature
of the charge and the possible consequences of his plea, and as a
condition of accepting the plea of guilty shall examine the de-
fendant and shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understand-
ably and voluntarily made without undue influence, compulsion
or duress, and without promise of leniency, but a defendant with-
out counsel cannot plead guilty to an indictment charging a
capital felony. Unless the Judge determines that the plea of
guilty was so made, it shall not be accepted.
Section 6. The South Carolina Supreme Court shall have
authority to make rules and regulations for the implementation
of this Act relating to the manner and method of assignment of
counsel, the determination of indigency, the waiver of counsel
and related matters, the adoption and approval of plans by coun-
ty bar associations regarding the method or assignment of
counsel among the licensed attorneys of the county and such other
2
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matters as shall be provided for the protection of the constitu-
tional rights of all persons charged with crime.
Section 7. Upon application by the indigent defendant or his
appointed attorney, reasonable expenses to insure his defense
shall be allowed and payment shall be made by the State Treas-
urer. The payment shall be directed by an Order of the trial or
resident Judge to the State Treasurer in the form and manner
authorized by the rules of the Supreme Court. All applications
for expenses shall be in the form of an Affidavit that such ex-
pense is reasonable and necessary and shall be signed by the de-
fendant or the appointed attorney, if one has been appointed.
Section 8. A defendant who has been convicted and has been
sentenced for six (6) months or more may apply for the appoint-
ment of counsel for appeal and if there is any reasonable justi-
fication for the appeal, as determined by the administrator,
counsel shall be assigned for such appeal. If the administrator
determines that there is no reasonable ground for appeal, he shall
state the reasons for his determination and shall forward his
findings with the application for counsel to the Court for final
determination.
Section 9a. A defendant who has been convicted and has been
sentenced for six ( 6) months or more may apply, as hereinafter
provided, for the appointment of counsel for the filing of a writ
of habeas corpus. The application for counsel may be filed with
the Defense Administrator in the County where the defendant
is incarcerated or with the Defense Administrator where the
sentence was imposed which the defendant is attacking. If there
is any reasonable justification for the proceeding counsel shall
be initially assigned in the County of application.
Section 9b. A writ of habeas corpus may be filed with the
Court in the jurisdiction where the defendant is incarcerated or
in the jurisdiction where the sentence was imposed which is
under attack. When the writ of habeas corpus is filed in the
jurisdiction where the defendant is incarcerated, the Court may
in its discretion, transfer the proceeding to the Court which im-
posed the sentence under attack unless there exists good cause,
shown in the application, for retaining the proceeding where
filed.
Section 9o. The Court receiving a writ of habeas corpus shall,
without delay, determine whether the proceeding is to be trans-
[Vol. 18
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ferred, without the necessity of hearing the matter on its merits.
Upon transfer, the appropriate defense administrator shall
notify the Defense administrator of the County to which the
action is transferred, who shall immediately designate counsel for
the purpose of representing the defendant, and the initial coun-
sel shall be relieved.
Section 10. When an appeal or writ of habeas corpus is taken
under this section, necessary trial and hearing transcripts and
records shall be furnished at State expense.
Section 11. Any County bar association as provided for in
Section 2 may adopt the plan for the naming and designation of
the attorneys in the county to serve as assigned counsel. The plan
adopted by a county bar association and approved by the Resi-
dent Judge and the Supreme Court shall be certified to the
County Administrator, established by this Act, and such plan
shall constitute the method by which counsel shall be selected in
the county to represent indigent defendants charged with crime
in that county. All appointments and assignments of counsel for
indigent defendants in the county shall be made in conformity
with the plan unless the resident or presiding judge, in his dis-
cretion, deems it proper in the furtherance of justice to appoint
as counsel an attorney who is not on the plan or list certified to
the county administrator, and if so, he is authorized to assign as
counsel to represent an indigent defendant attorneys not listed
on the plan.
Section 12. When an attorney is appointed to represent an
indigent defendant, the Court shall determine an attorney's fee
which shall be reasonable and commensurate with time consumed.
Such attorney shall be paid at the rate of $10.00 per hour for
time spent out of Court and $15.00 per hour for time spent in
Court. In no event shall such fee exceed the sum of $500.00 in a
non-capital case and $750.00 in a capital case.
Section 13. No attorney shall be appointed as counsel for in-
digent defendants in a Court of any county except the county in
which he resides or maintains an office or engages in substantial
practice except by consent of counsel so appointed or unless the
judge, in his discretion, deems that the appointment is necessary
in the ends of justice, and such appointment is approved by the
Supreme Court.
Section 14. No indigent defendant shall be entitled or per-
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mitted to select or specify the attorney who shall be assigned to
represent him.
Section 15. There shall be appointed for each county or group
of counties which have joined together for the purpose of com-
plying with this Bill a defense administrator by the resident cir-
cuit judge upon the recommendation of the county bar associa-
tion. The defense administrator shall be an attorney at law
and when there is more than one recommendation from a multi-
county district, the Judge shall appoint the administrator. The
defense administrator shall file, maintain and keep current the
plan for the assignment of counsel applicable to the county as
certified to him by the county bar association. The administrator
shall keep records which will reflect the name of each defendant,
the name of the attorney appointed to represent him, the date of
the appointment, the appointing judge, the amount of time ex-
pended by the attorney for investigation, research and trial, the
expenses incurred and the result.
Section 16. The county administrator shall be responsible for
receiving all requests for counsel by persons accused of crime,
shall be responsible for investigating the indigency of the appli-
cants for counsel and have such applicant for counsel complete
and sign under oath an Affidavit of Indigency in the form sub-
stantially as set out in Form No. 1. If an applicant is entitled
to have counsel assigned to him, the defense administrator shall
make such assignment in accordance with the rules of the county
bar association as certified to him and shall notify the attorney
so assigned and the resident or circuit judge of the assignment.
The assignment by the administrator must be confirmed by
Order of the presiding or resident circuit judge or county judge.
If an applicant for assigned counsel has some assets but cannot
employ private counsel the administrator shall assign to him
counsel, but shall receive from the applicant such funds as the
applicant has available for employment of counsel and shall pay
same into the fund. The county administrator shall perform such
other duties including representing defendants in courts as are
assigned to him by the rules of the Supreme Court or by the
rules of the county bar association as approved by the resident
judge and the Supreme Court.
Section 17. The county administrator shall be paid the fol-
lowing:
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2. In the counties with a population between 10,000 and 20,000
-$900 per year.
3. In the counties with a population between 20,000 and 30,000
-$1,200 per year.
4. In the counties with a population between 30,000 and 40,000
-$1,500 per year.
5. In the counties with a population between 40,000 and 50,000
-$1,800 per year.
6. In the counties with a population between 50,00 and 60,000
-$2,100 per year.
7. In the counties with a population between 60,000 and 80,000
-$2,400 per year.
8. In the counties with a population between 80,000 and
100,000-$2,700 per year.
9. In the counties with a population over 100,000-$3,000 per
year.
The county may supplement the salary of the county adminis-
trator and may assign to him duties in addition to those set forth
herein, if such duties are submitted to and approved by the resi-
dent judge and filed with the county administrator and the
Supreme Court. When two or more counties join together for
the purpose of establishing a defense system, the appointed ad-
ministrator shall receive both amounts designated above.
Section 18. Any county may establish or approve the repre-
sentation of indigent defendants by a public or private defender,
paid by a public or private group or corporation, provided the
rights of person represented are protected as provided for in
this Act and provided the representation is approved by the
County Bar Association, the Resident Circuit Judge and the
Supreme Court.
Section 19. If so authorized by the county bar association, the
resident circuit judge and the Supreme Court, a county adminis-
trator may employ such assistants, investigators, stenographers
and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the duties
assigned to him.
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IH. BACKGROUND OF TH. PROPOSED DEF-NSE OF INDIGENTS ACT
Low=ll W. Ross*
In March 1628, Parliament won from King Charles I the
"Petition of Right" which guaranteed that a man should not be
imprisoned without a trial.' This was one of the great building
blocks of English freedom. Of equal importance in the wall be-
tween freedom and bondage is Gideon v. Wainwright2 in which
the Court held that an indigent person accused of a crime must
be provided with counsel.
Both of these significant human rights are the result of man's
search for justice and have their origin in antiquity. All preju-
dices aside, it is extremely difficult to determine which of these
rights is of greater importance, yet one of them is considered to
be deeply embedded in our criminal law as an absolute right
and the other is considered, at least by some, to be a product of
a radical Court.
The Great Sanhedrin which conducted the most famous trial
in the recorded history of the human race recognized the right
of an accused person to representation.3 Under the Mosaic Code,
one member of the Great Sanhedrin had to defend a person who
stood before that body accused of a violation of the laws. With-
out such a defense, any sentence the Sanhedrin might impose
was invalid.
4
* Rogers, McDonald, and Ross, Columbia, South Carolina. The writer is
indebted to James C. Blakely, Jr., Clerk of the South Carolina Bar Association
Committee on Legal Services to the Poor, for his assistance in the research and
drafting of this article.
The article is an analysis of the REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR. The committee was composed of the following
members: Lowell W. Ross, chairman, Benny R. Greer, Esquire, vice-chairman,
Donald V. Richardson, III, Esquire, and Brantley Phillips, Esquire, members
of drafting sub-committee; John H. Nolen, Esquire, and Arthur G. Howe,
Esquire, solicitor consultants; Bobby M. Pruitt, Esquire, and W. Brantley
Harvey, Jr., Esquire, legislative consultants; and Paul A. Sansbury, Esquire,
of counsel.
1. 2 CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES-A NEW
WORrD 185 (1956). The jury system had been evolving since 1189. After 1625
it existed substantially as we know it today.
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. The Great Sanhedrin had two presiding officers, a religious chamber
composed of twventy-three priests, a law chamber composed of twenty-three
scribes, and a popular chamber made up of twenty-three elders.
4. WHITE, THE LAW IN THE SCRIPTURES 312 n. 10 (1935). See generally
CHANDLER, THE TRIAL OF JESUS-FRoM A LAwYER's STANDPOINT (1925);
RIcHARDS, THE ILLEGALITY OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS (1914); AxYAR, THE
LEGALITY OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS (1914).
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The right to counsel in our law has been a long time in the
making. Before 1695, persons accused of treason or a felony were
permitted to have counsel as to questions of law but not as to
facts.5 In 1695 Parliament passed an act which provided that a
person charged with treason was entitled to counsel on matters
of both law and fact and that if the accused could not afford
counsel, the trial court was authorized to appoint a lawyer to
represent him.6
The Colonial legislature of South Carolina adopted the 1695
English act in 17127 and in 1731 extended the right to counsel
to all capital cases by providing that an accused had the right
"to make his and their full defense, by counsel learned in the
law. . . . And in case any person . . . shall desire counsel, the
court . . . is hereby authorized and required immediately, upon
his or their request, to assign . . . such and so many counsel
not exceeding two as the person or persons shall desire, to whom
such counsel shall have free access at all reasonable times."8 The
substance of this provision has survived until today both in the
Constitution 9 and by legislative enactment.'0
When one considers the other basic rights which have been
won by English speaking people down through the years and
the basic necessity for the right of counsel to make the right to a
trial of any benefit, the surprising thing is not that the effective
right to counsel has been established but, rather, that it took
so long for the right to be guaranteed and that judicial decision
was the method used to give it to the people. Although Gideon
had shocking effect on the administration of criminal law when
handed down, twenty-five years from now those who will think
back to such things will undoubtedly be shocked that anyone
ever doubted the effective right to counsel as a necessary part of
our adversary process.
South Carolina is one of the six states which do not provide
for compensating counsel appointed to represent indigent de-
5. See Heidelbaugh & Becker, Benefit of Counsel in Criminal Cases i the
Time of Coke, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 546 (1952).
6. The Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3. The distinction betwmeen fact
and law insofar as felony trials are concerned was not abolished until 1863.
Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6, 7, & 8 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1.
7. 2 S.C. STATUTES 539 (Cooper's ed. 1837).
8. 3 S.C. STATUTES 289 (Cooper's ed. 1837).
9. S.C. CoisT. art. 1, § 18 (1895).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17.407 (1962).
8
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fendants." The courts have imposed the responsibility of repre-
senting indigent defendants on the theory that a lawyer is an
officer of the court. This system now deserves a new analysis in
view of the revolution in criminal law. Members of other pro-
fessions perform charity work on a voluntary basis and in so
doing render a valuable service to their communities. It is only
in the legal profession, however, that the members are ordered
to perform a particular service. The attorneys of South Carolina
have traditionally served their state and its citizens voluntarily
and have not, individually or otherwise, contested the power of
the courts to assign indigent clients to them.
12
Some argue that paying lawyers for representing indigent
defendants is socialization of the law. Others maintain that sub-
stantial good will favoring the bar in general is generated by
the public being aware of the services its members render to the
poor without compensation. First of all, the meager fees that will
be paid to attorneys under the proposed bill will not make any
significant impact upon the income of the bar. The true effect
will be to shift some of the burden of providing legal repre-
sentation for those who cannot afford to pay for it to society.
Secondly, the argument relating to good will overlooks the fact
that the general public does not know what the members of the
legal profession do for the poor, and, even if it did, it is doubtful
11. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 16 (1965).
12. There has been considerable controversy over the question of whether the
payment of fees to lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants is com-
pulsory. Recently, in State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that all lawyers assigned to represent
indigent defendants must be paid. In that case, the court gave the legislature
until January 1, 1967 to establish a satisfactory system. See Dillon v. United
States, 239 F. Supp. 487 (D.C. Ore. 1964) reo'd, 364 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) ;
Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1439, 1444 (1944).
Apparently Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and New Jersey are the only states in
which the courts have held that court appointed attorneys are entitled to com-
pensation.
This problem was discussed in an editorial appearing in The State, Saturday,
December 18, 1965 as a result of the Honorable Thomas B. Greneker's order
requiring Florence County to pay 200 dollars each to two court-appointed at-
torneys for the legal services they rendered to indigent defendants. The edi-
torial was critical of Judge Greneker's order, saying that if the court could
order payment of attorneys fees from tax funds, it could order the payment
of medical fees for treatment of the sick. The editor failed to recognize that
furnishing counsel is done to satisfy a constitutional guarantee. There is no
such guarantee of medical services.
[Vol. 18
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that such knowledge would have much effect upon the reputa-
tion of the bar.13
There are several systems which could be used to provide in-
digent defendants with counsel: (1) an assigned counsel system,
(2) a private defender system, (3) a public defender system, (4)
a combined assigned-defender system.
(1) An Assigned Counsel System. Under this system the court
assigns private counsel to represent indigents when necessary.
A partial assigned counsel system is now operative by virtue of
section 17-507 of the Code, which provides for assignment of
counsel for persons accused of any capital offense. Apparently
there is no other provision under the South Carolina law for
assignment of counsel and no provision whatsoever for payment
of counsel or for payment of costs or expenses. Before Gideon,
the assignment of counsel was made in capital cases and, since
Gideon, assignments have been made in capital and non-capital
cases, but the methods of assigning counsel vary from circuit
to circuit and from judge to judge.
(2) A Private Defender System. 'Under this system counsel
is provided through an office financed by private donations of
various firms, corporations or institutions. This system would
not be adequate since it would only work in large metropolitan
areas where there are sufficient resources to provide for such
an office. No such systems are now in existence in South
Carolina.
(3) A Public Defender System. Under this system there would
be created the office of public defender in each county or a com-
bination of counties, which would be financed by funds appro-
priated by the county or state. The public defender would defend
all indigent defendants.
(4) Combined Systems of Assigned Counsel and Public or
Private Defenders. This system attempts to utilize the best parts
of the other systems. It permits the bar to participate in the pro-
gram without requiring that it assume all of the burden of
13. Related to the problem of compensating attorneys for representing indi-
gent defendants is providing funds to enable such a defendant's attorney
sufficient funds to adequately prepare a defense. An adequate defense often
requires employing doctors, investigators, photographers, handwriting experts,
and other expert witnesses who require payment for their services. A lawyer as-
signed to represent an indigent defendant is placed in a peculiar position. If he
does not expend the money from his resources necessary to acquire the needed
items, the person he is defending may well seek a writ of habeas corpus at
some later time asserting that he was denied an adequate defense.
1966]
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representation and the burden of paying the expenses of the
defense.
The most difficult problem in devising any method for pro-
viding counsel for indigents in South Carolina is meeting the
requirements of Escobedo V. Illinois.14 This case held that:
[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusa-
tory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate,
and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be per-
mitted to consult with his lawyer.'5
It is fairly well settled law that the guarantee of counsel comes
into being at the so-called "critical stages" of criminal proceed-
ings,16 but what constitutes a critical stage is unknown. The
United States Supreme Court held in White v. Maryland17 that
a preliminary hearing in Maryland was a critical stage. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that a preliminary
hearing was not a critical stage' on the ground that the de-
fendant would not be prejudiced. 19
Based on the trend of the cases as evidenced by 'White v.
Maryland, 2 0  and the interpretation given them by various
courts2 ' one could say that future federal cases will make it man-
datory that, under certain circumstances, counsel must be as-
14. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
15. Id. at 492. Escobedo had been arrested without a warrant, interrogated
in connection with a murder and released. He was again taken into custody
for questioning after an accomplice implicated him. Shortly after his arrest,
his lawyer arrived and requested to talk to his client, but his request was
denied. Escobedo repeatedly requested permission to talk with his lawyer, but
was also denied permission. After intensive interrogation, the police extracted
an incriminating statement from the accused. The interrogation had taken place
prior to indictment and at no time had Escobedo been advised of his right to
remain silent. The statements given to the police were used at his trial and he
was convicted. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
16. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961).
17. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
18. Ex parte Glidden, 240 F. Supp. 694 (E.D.S.C. 1965) ; Williams v. State,
237 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.S.C. 1965) ; Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d
713 (1964).
19. "In South Carolina, the Preliminary Hearing serves the purpose of de-
termining whether the State can show probable cause . . ., and he is not per-
mitted to plead or even make a sworn statement. . . ." State v. White, 243 S.C.
238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963).
20. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Rauzzo v. Sigler, 346 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1965) ; United States
ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964). Compare Harris v.
Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204 (D.C. Cal. 1965) with State v. Blacksmith, 194
Kan. 643, 500 P.2d 743 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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signed immediately upon arrest, at preliminary hearings, 22 be-
fore interrogation or at any time when counsel would have or
could have preserved rights, brought to light favorable evidence,
established weaknesses in the state's case, or otherwise developed
advantages which disappear with the passage of time. A defend-
ant may not be prejudiced at a preliminary hearing by what
transpires, but failure to assign counsel who could have advised
the defendant to ask for a preliminary hearing and could have
developed favorable advantages during a hearing may contra-
vene the federal standard.
23
It seems that it is essential to a legal conviction, as determined
by the federal courts, that every accused be advised that he is
entitled to counsel and that, if a request is made, he be given
counsel at the "critical stage." The critical stage might well be
ten minutes after arrest, it might be the next day or the next
week. In any event, the present system in South Carolina of
having counsel appointed by the court immediately before ar-
raignment is not workable.2 4 There must be available a person
to receive requests for assignment of counsel, determine eligibil-
ity, and assign counsel promptly. If an accused is questioned
without notification of his rights or has made a confession under
questionable circumstances, there is a serious question as to
whether any conviction of the accused would stand. It is there-
fore quite possible for admitted criminals to go free because
the state has not complied with the requirements of the United
States interpretation of due process.
It is imperative, therefore, that some system be devised for
notifying persons as soon as possible after their arrest of their
rights to counsel, and some system must be devised for furnish-
ing counsel promptly.
The best system which can be instituted in South Carolina is
a paid assigned counsel system and an administrator in each
county to administer the program with the option given to each
county to permit the administrator to represent defendants in
court if the county bar association desires. Under this system, a
22. Pursuant to provisions of S.C. CODE ANm. § 43-232 (1962) a person
charged with a crime must file a written demand for a preliminary hearing.
It has been held that failure to make this request constitutes a waiver of the
preliminary hearing. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963);
State v. Irby, 166 S.C. 430, 164 S.E. 912 (1932).
23. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
24. See Annot. 5 A.L.R.3d 1269 (1966). In this extensive annotation, the
problem discussed is at what point in the criminal process, between arrest and
arraignment, the accused is entitled to the advice of counsel.
12
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defense administrator, who would be a local attorney, would be
appointed in each county by the resident judge upon the recom-
mendation of the county bar association. The appointment of
counsel would be made by a plan prepared by the county bar
association, approved by the resident circuit judge and the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina. The duties of the administrator
would be to advise persons accused of crime that they are en-
titled to counsel, to determine indigency, and to make prelim-
inary assignments of counsel in accordance with the county plan.
This plan permits early assignment of counsel, an essential ele-
ment of any workable plan.
Counsel would be paid from a state fund at the rate of fifteen
dollars per hour for court time and ten dollars for out-of-court
time with a maximum of 500 dollars for non-capital cases and
750 dollars in capital cases.
Defendants would, at the time of application for counsel, sign
a pauper's oath, and pay any available monies into the fund. The
proposed bill creates a claim against the assets of the defendant
equal to the cost of the defense but gives the court the power to
modify or waive the claim and the pay of administrators is to
be based upon the population of the county to be served.
III. COmMENTs oN THE PROP0SED DEFENSE OF INDIGENTS ACT
E. B. LATm *
A. Introduction
Justice cannot depend on the size of a man's pocketbook. Yet
until the Supreme Court decided in Gideon v. Vainwright' that
counsel must be provided by the state to every person "charged
with crime,"2 that principle was essentially absent from state
jurisprudence. That was an inevitable result, but very few states
had the foresight to make provision for it. As early as 1731,
however, South Carolina had a statutes requiring the appoint-
ment of counsel in capital cases when requested by an accused,
but it was not until 1932 that the Supreme Court of the United
States held in PowelZ v. AZabama4 that the principle of the 1731
* Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina; LL.B., University of South
Carolina School of Law.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Ibid.
3. Discussed in State v. Grant, 119 S.C. 412, 418, 19 S.E.2d 638, 644 (1941).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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South Carolina statute was essential to "due process law" as
applied to the states. Rarely did any state provide for appoint-
ment of counsel in other than capital cases and Betts v. Brady5
held that this practice satisfied the requirements of "due process
of law." The dissent of four justices in Betts foreshadowed later
developments.
B. South Carolina Practice
South Carolina recognizes the requirements of Gideon. Trial
judges now formally advise all defendants without counsel of
their right to have court-appointed counsel or to waive that right.
But that advice is not given until arraignment, which takes place
after indictment by the grand jury. Furthermore in South Caro-
lina appointment of counsel is not consistently applied, and it
is this lack of a uniform procedure which could lead to abuses
and shortcomings resulting in a variety of brands of justice.
Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark characterizes most systems of assigning
counsel as "archaic, slipshod and ineffective.""
Two threshold problems will exist under any system: who is
indigent and when must counsel be appointed? Today in South
Carolina if a man asks for counsel and says he cannot afford it,
counsel will be appointed, and it is the responsibility of counsel
to guard against free representation being given those who can
really afford it. No procedure exists in this state now to deter-
mine indigency. As previously stated, counsel in South Carolina
is appointed at arraignment. The case of -hite 'v. Maryland7
requires appointment of counsel when the "critical stage" of the
criminal proceeding is reached, and defines a "critical stage" as
the stage of criminal proceedings where "rights are preserved
or lost."8 What this means is still subject to interpretation by
the Supreme Court and is not at all clear. White held that the
preliminary hearing in Maryland was a "critical stage" since
the defendant entered a plea when he had no counsel. At the
trial the plea of guilty at the preliminary hearing was intro-
duced into evidence. The conviction was reversed. South Carolina
provides a preliminary hearing only if a defendant demands it
within ten days before the next term of General Sessions Court,9
5. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
6. Reader's Digest, April 1965, p. 127 (condensation of an article by Murray
Teigh Bloom in The National- Civic Review, March 1966).
7. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
8. Ibid.
9. S.C. CODE ANx. § 43-232 (1962).
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but the accused is not allowed to plead or to make a sworn state-
ment.10 Rather, the preliminary hearing serves to determine
whether the state can show probable cause in order to hold the
defendant.' The federal court in Williams v. South Carolina42
held that the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing is not
a ground for a new trial, and that failure to provide an attorney
in time to demand such a hearing does not deny due process.
Thus, arraignment is the first "critical stage" under South Caro-
lina procedure.
Undoubtedly, Gideon has increased the case load of all courts
in South Carolina. Habeas corpus petitions are booming. The
following statistics speak for themselves: 1958-59 fiscal year-18
habeas corpus proceedings; 1959-60-85 proceedings; 1960-61-
135 proceedings; 1961-62-64 proceedings; 1962-63-110 proceed-
ings; 1963-64--120 proceedings; 1964-65-178 proceedings. Trial
court proceedings have been considerably slowed down. Judge
John Grimball of the fifth judicial circuit, which handles more
criminal cases than any other circuit, estimates that at every
term of General Sessions Court for Richland County seventy-
five to one hundred lawyers are appointed to represent indigent
defendants.
To alleviate part of this situation, the General Assembly
amended the 1962 Code by adding section 17-359.1, to wit:
Any judge before whom a petition for writ of habeas corpus
is made by any person in confinement who has been tried and
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall upon
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus transfer the matter for
hearing to any judge of any court of competent jurisdiction
in the county where the person was convicted.
All habeas corpus petitions will now be handled by the coun-
ties in which the petitioners were sentenced rather than by Rich-
land County, where the petitioners are incarcerated.
In state courts nationally it has been estimated that fifty to
seventy-five percent of defendants are indigent and that ninety-
five percent plead guilty. Attorneys must be appointed for these
defendants, but this is too heavy a burden to rest entirely on the
shoulders of the state bar. Where more than thirty percent of
all defendants annually require the appointment of attorneys
10. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963).
11. Ibid.
12. 237 F. Supp. 360 (1965).
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because of indigency,"' Congress enacted the Criminal Justice
Act' 4 in 1964, providing for the appointment and payment of
counsel for indigents in federal cases. Yet, with over fifty per
cent of the persons accused of crimes being unable to afford legal
representation, 15 South Carolina is one of only six states" in the
entire nation which do not provide paid counsel for indigent
defendants. It should be remembered that the poor are served
in almost every other professional area at public expense through
welfare legislation. Action is urgently needed in South Carolina.
One improvement was instituted in Richland County on Jan-
uary 1, 1965, when a special investigator took office. His job is
to check the city and county jails once a week to see who is in
jail, why, and who wants a lawyer; to check on claims of indi-
gency and to ask the judge to appoint an attorney if the defend-
ant cannot pay; and finally, to assist defense attorneys who have
legitimate need for further investigation of any matter they
think will help their case.
A startling and yet refreshing development in South Carolina
procedure occurred on December 15, 1965. Judge T. B. Greneker
ordered Florence County to pay each of three court-appointed
attorneys a fee of 200 dollars for representing indigent defend-
ants in General Sessions Court. In issuing this order Judge
Greneker said, "I may go to jail for this . . . (It) is something
of a test . . . But I just want to see if anybody will be foolish
enough to overrule it.11T
Gideon v. Wainwright has created many problems in its wake.
Judge John Grimball has summarized the problems and possible
solutions in an excellent article appearing in the May, 1964: issue
of Transcript, where he said:
The usual indigent defendant is totally devoid of any
sense of loyalty to his appointed attorneys and completely
ungrateful for the services performed on his behalf. Such an
accused, if convicted, . . will stop at nothing to regain
his freedom. He will with alacrity make the most damaging,
libelous accusations against the Court, the Solicitor, and his
13. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., p.2991 (1964).
14. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
15. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF TRE S.C. BAR Ass'x, REPORT ON LEGAL SEavIcEs
TO THE POOR, finding no. 3.
16. Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah. See
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR, A FIxLD STUDY AND REPORT FOR THE BAR
FOUNDATION, 16 (1965).
17. The State, Dec. 16, 1965.
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appointed counsel, if he feels that it will assist him in some
legal process to gain his freedom. But when more than one
attorney participates in the defense, it is protection to every-
one engaged in the trial against subsequent false accusations
as to the manner in which the trial was conducted and con-
cerning any negotiations for a possible plea of guilty that
may have taken place. (In Richland County two attorneys
are almost always appointed to relieve a single attorney of
criticism by a defendant who is convicted.)
The Courts should be provided with public defenders or with
a system of paying for the services of lawyers (appointed
to represent indigent defendants) or a combination of these
two systems. . . . It is not reasonable, fair or just to ask
or to require the lawyers of South Carolina to pick up the
entire tab for the defenses of indigent defendants by giving
their time and skill for this purpose .... [P]rotection of the
constitutional liberties of the people of this State is a
public matter and the cost should be met by the taxpayers
at large and it should not be foisted upon the members of
the legal profession on the sole basis that they are skilled in
this kind of work. The bench and bar must close ranks in
this situation and see to it that proper financial arrange-
ments are made to effectively take care of the defense of
indigent citizens charged with crime.
To my certain knowledge, all lawyers are ready and willing
to their fair share of this type of work but it is an imposi-
tion and an unfair burden to require them to carry the whole
burden and to assume the complete responsibility for this
activity.
0. Thie Proposed Bill
The South Carolina Bar Association is acutely aware of the
problem and has appointed a committee on legal services to the
poor, Lowell W. Ross, Chairman. The task of the committee was
to draft a proposal for legislation to meet the impact of the
Gideon case. The committee recognized that "the magnitude of
the problem far exceeds the capacity of South Carolina lawyers
to meet it on charity basis. Public financial support is urgently
needed to assure equal justice for the poor. 18
18. SPECIAL CommiTTEE OF THE S.C. BAR Ass'N, REPOr oN LEGAL SE .cES
TO THE PoaR, findings no. 5 and 6.
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In recommending legislation the committee faced the "serious
question if an indigent defendant who is provided a non-paid,
hion-volunteer lawyer is furnished counsel in accordance with the
requirements of Gideon.""0 That is the primary hurdle facing
opponents of legislation for paying counsel fees. Furthermore,
it is "patently unconstitutional to deny to an indigent defendant
funds to adequately prepare his defense." 20
The recommended plan of the committee has been referred to
the Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina for com-
ment, the basis for much of which will be a comparison with
the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964. The South Carolina
plan is entitled "The Defense of Indigents Act," and it would
apply to any defendant who is "financially unable to obtain an
adequate defense." 21 In addition to this standard, four other
standards are set up by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to de-
termine whether a defendant is eligible under the act. He must
be financially unable to obtain representation; to obtain counsel;
to pay counsel whom he has retained; or to obtain investigative,
expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his
case. 22 With this test uppermost, we now proceed to consider the
Defense of Indigents Act as proposed for South Carolina.
Section 1 of the proposal requires that a person charged with
a crime be advised of his right to counsel if he is not already
represented. In South Carolina a person is charged with a crime
at the time of arrest. We recommend that the arresting officer
inform the accused within a reasonable time after his arrest that
he can request court-appointed counsel if he cannot afford to
retain private counsel. Further, the police should provide the
defense administrator (see section 15) with a daily list of persons
arrested, and indicate for each person whether or not he has his
own counsel and requests that counsel be appointed or wishes
to waive counsel. The administrator should interview those who
waive counsel and explain to them the significance of waiver.
This procedure should be used in order to have the defendant
reaffirm his waiver of counsel for the record after being fully
advised. By use of the daily list counsel may enter the picture
at the earliest convenient stage. Under the federal act 28 repre-
19. Id., "Problems".
20. Ibid.
21. Id., "Recommended Plan" § 1.
22. 36 F.R.D. 67 (1964).
23. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (c) (1964).
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sentation is provided at every stage of the proceeding, beginning
with the appearance before the United States Commissioner 24
and continuing through appeal. South Carolina would do well
to follow this procedure closely. The South Carolina General
Assembly can act voluntarily at the present time. It may be faced
with a federal court edict in the matter at some future date.
Whether our procedure of appointing counsel at arraignment is
soon enough is a matter of serious doubt.
Section 1 provides for the appointment of counsel when "a
person is charged with a crime" and it appears possible that
counsel may be paid even for representation in city and magis-
trate courts.
Under the proposal counsel must be appointed for a crime in-
volving a possible sentence of six months. If the sentence be less,
the judge may appoint counsel if he feels "such appointment is
warranted. 2 5 The question whether counsel must be appointed
in misdemeanor cases has not yet been decided by the Supreme
Court.20
Section 2 provides for assignment of counsel where a person
has some assets but not enough to employ private counsel. Under
the Criminal Justice Act, if the defendant at any stage of the
proceedings, including an appeal, becomes financially unable to
pay counsel he has retained, the court may appoint counsel.2 7
24. FED. R. CRIA. P. 5(b) provides that the "Commissioner shall inform
the defendant of the [charges] against him, of his right to retain counsel and of
his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the de-
fendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made
by him may be used against him. . . " FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(c) provides that
"the defendant shall not be called upon to plead" before the Commissioner, who
instead holds the preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause
exists "to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
has committed it."
25. South Carolina Proposed Defense of Indigents Act § 1.
26. However, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the "serious offense" rule for
misdemeanors and has extended the right of counsel to "petty offenses." In
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) the defendant was charged
with "possession of whiskey," which is a misdemeanor under Mississippi law,
punIshable by a fine up to 500 dollars and up to ninety days in jail. He pledguilty and received the maximum sentence, but no counsel was provided and
his sentence was set aside. In McDonald v. Moore, 353 F2d 106 (5th Cir.1965) the defendant pled guilty to charges of illegally possessing and selling
whiskey, both of which were misdemeanors under Florida law. She was sen-
tenced to serve six months in jail or pay a fine of 250 dollars for each offense.
The conviction was set aside.
Under the proposed act, South Carolina is safe under McDonald and prob-
ably under Halrvey, but neither decision is satisfied by present law. There is
little doubt that Gideon applies to misdemeanors, and it would be wise for
South Carolina to recognize this fact early.
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Presumably, counsel could be appointed under the proposal at
any time when the defendant became indigent. This is as it
should be.
Section 4 provides for waiver of counsel if it is "voluntary and
understandably" made in writing. In Pitt v. MaoDougall2" the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that failure to request coun-
sel is not a waiver, nor may waiver be presumed from a silent
record. It must affirmatively appear either in the record or
through evidence that counsel was offered but was "intelligently
and understandingly rejected. 2 9 An offer of counsel must be
made. The federal act is intended to discourage waiver of coun-
sel by allowing a defendant to revoke his waiver and to apply
for counsel at any stage of the proceedings. Presumably the pro-
posed South Carolina act grants the same right although it is
not affirmatively stated. It would probably be unconstitutional
not to do so.
Section 7 authorizes "reasonable expenses to insure his defense"
when applied for by an indigent defendant or his appointed
counsel. This includes, but is not limited to, fingerprint, psychi-
atric, and ballistic experts as well as criminal investigators, etc.
However, the proposed act applies only to appointed counsel,80
while the federal act applies also to retained attorneys.81 The fed-
eral act meets the constitutional guarantee much more clearly
than the proposed state act by focusing its attention on providing
the most effective representation rather than concentrating solely
on appointed counsel who must fend for himself. Not many
retained lawyers can afford to provide all the services required.
The fee is often large enough to meet only personal expenses
and few defendants can afford all the necessary services. Fur-
thermore, ex parte proceedings on the application to the court
for approval of expenses for services, other than counsel, are ad-
visable to remove the necessity of disclosing the defense prema-
turely. Presumably the broad rule-making power of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina under section 6 could provide for this.
The federal act makes specific provision for an ex parte proceed-
ing in section 2006(e). There is no specific provision in the pro-
posed act for ratification by anyone of expenses which had to
27. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1964).
28. 245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
29. Ibid.
30. South Carolina Proposed Defense of Tndigents Act § 7.
31. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964).
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be made before receiving approval of the court. Probably there
is room to include this, but it is uncertain.
Of particular significance is the fact that the South Carolina
proposal sets no limit on expenses for services other than counsel,
except the requirement that they be reasonable,32 while the fed-
eral act sets a limit of 300 dollars to be paid to any person or
organization for such services.33
Professor of Law James A. Lake, Sr., of the University of
Nebraska feels that
[T]he issue of reimbursement for investigative expenses
should not turn on whether any evidence usable to the de-
fendant was secured by the expenditure, or, in other in-
stances, whether the defense actually used at the trial evi-
dence secured by the expenditure. Such a test is unrealistic
and unduly restrictive. It encourages trial counsel to explore
only those avenues of inquiry which he can foresee will prove
fruitful, when every attorney knows that a good lawyer-like
job of investigation often entails turning many stones, some
yielding nothing usable for the defense. Likewise, perfectly
legal defense strategy may be impeded by a rule which re-
quires evidence turned up in an investigation to be used
before reimbursement will be forthcoming. Much more pre-
ferable would be a rule which authorizes public payment for
any investigation which would be undertaken by a diligent
attorney proceeding in a lawyerlike way to prepare a de-
fense for his client, and permits a judge to approve the ex-
pense upon finding that the proposed search appeared to be
reasonably necessary for this purpose.
3 4
Under the South Carolina proposal counsel is appointed at
three separate stages: before trial (section 1), for appeal (section
8), and for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
(section 9). The federal act makes one appointment for trial and
appeal but none at all for habeas corpus35 or other collateral
matters. South Carolina has substantially improved on the fed-
eral act with regard to such collateral maters.
32. South Carolina Proposed Defense of Indigents Act § 7.
33. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1964).
34. 44 NE. L. REv. 751, 775 (1965).
35. Shafroth, The New Criminal Justice Act, 50 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1050 (1964).
Mr. Shafroth is the former Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. Cf. 44 NEB. L. Ray. 767, n. 43 (1965).
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In addition separate fees. are to be paid by the state for each
separate stage of the proceedings in South Carolina.8 6 Thus, a
lawyer representing the defendant at the trial, on appeal, and
for filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus earns three
separate fees. The federal act provides similarly as far as it
goes.37 The South Carolina proposal improves on the federal act
by providing a fee for each attorney,38 while the federal act"
only provides a single fee for all trial counsel and a single fee
for all appellate counsel, no matter how many lawyers are in-
volved at either stage. However, the federal act does have a sav-
ing clause which South Carolina should consider. It is section
3006A (d), which provides that "in extraordinary circumstances,
payment in excess of the limits [300 dollars for misdemeanors
and 500 dollars for felonies] may be made if the District Court
certifies that such payment is necessary to provide fair compen-
sation for protracted representation, and the amount of the ex-
cess payment is approved by the Chief Judge of the Circuit."
The saving clause does not apply to appeals. 40 South Carolina
would provide an absolute limit on counsel fees of 500 dollars for
non-capital cases and 750 dollars for capital cases. 41
It is considered appropriate that South Carolina provide for
additional compensation in extraordinary circumstances, sub-
stantially in accordance with the federal procedure.
The major improvement over the federal act is found in sec-
tion 18 of the proposal, which allows the establishment of public
or private defender programs by any county, with the approval
36. This view is based on the provisions in § 1 (counsel at trial), § 8 (de-
fendant may apply for counsel on appeal), § 9(a) (appointed counsel's filing
of a habeas corpus writ), and § 12 (payment of fees when attorney is
appointed).
37. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(d) (1964), provides for a separate claim
for compensation and reimbursement to be made to the district court and to
each appellate court in which the attorney has appeared for the defendant.
The limits also appear in this section.
38. Section 12 of the proposed Defense of Indigents Act provides that "when
an attorney is appointed to represent an indigent defendant," the attorney will
be paid a fee.
39. While 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1964) provides for pay-
ments to an attorney, the author of the legislation stated in debate, "in order
that the record might be made clear, and as the bill is written, it is 500 dollars
per case." 110 CONG. REc. 447 (1964) (remarks of Senator Moore). Cf. 44
Nan. L. REv. 722, n. 62 (1965).
40. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1964).
41. South Carolina Proposed Defense of Indigents Act § 12.
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of the county bar association, the resident circuit judge, and the
supreme court. Extensive efforts to provide this "local option"
in the federal system failed. However, the success of public de-
fender systems in more than 110 cities and counties mainly in
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana and Massachusetts, is
evidence that it will work in the right atmosphere. Georgia and
Florida have both instituted such a system, and it works well
in both states. The Office of the Attorney General takes no posi-
tion on the desirability of establishing defender systems in any
particular county. If a county is- interested, then a defender
system is well worth serious consideration.
Section 10 of the proposal provides that trial and hearing
transcripts and records necessary to an appeal or writ of habeas
corpus will be provided at state expense. It is unclear whether
transcripts of preliminary hearings or coroner's inquest hearings
would be supplied at any level of the proceedings.
Section 11 provides for the establishment of plans under which
counsel for indigents would be appointed. Any plan used must
comply with the requirements of the sufficiency of counsel as
set out in Tillman v. State42 which are:
(1) Counsel must be a member of the Bar in good standing.
(2) Counsel must give "his client his complete loyalty."
(3) Counsel must serve his client "in good faith to the best
of his ability."
(4) Counsel's service must be "of such character as to preserve
the essential integrity of the proceedings as a trial in a
court of justice."
(5) Counsel "is not required to be infallible, nor to do the im-
possible, since the defendant is entitled to a fair trial and
not a perfect one or a perfect result."
In summary, the Office of the Attorney General favors the
prompt enactment of the proposed Defense of Indigents Act.
Our comments are merely suggestions for improvement and are
not intended as anything other than constructive criticism.
42. 244 S.C. 259, 264, 136 S.E.2d 300 (1964).
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A. Introduction
There is an urgent need for substantial revision of South Caro-
lina's administration of criminal justice. The rapid and impor-
tant changes in this field at the national level have rendered the
bulk of federal and state standards obsolete. Gideon v. Wain-
wrght,l Esoobedo 'v. Illinois,2 White v. Maryland,3 Rideau v.
Louisiana,4 and Jackson v. Denno5 are cases of the 60's. These
cases reflect a renewed faith in the adversary system as a means
of distributing justice.
In theory, American criminal administration, more than any
other field of law, relies upon the adversary system. The suspect
is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution is burdened with constitutional restric-
tions. Where potential abuse may develop, the Constitution
strikes the balance in favor of the accused.
In the modern era it is not always fully understood that
the adversary system performs a vital social function and
is the product of long historical experience. The state trials
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England demonstrated
that a system of justice that provides inadequate opportuni-
ties to challenge official decisions is not only productive of
injuries to individuals, but is itself a threat to the state's
security and to the larger interests of the community. The
adversary system is the institution devised by our legal order
for the proper reconciliation of public and private interests
in the crucial areas of penal, regulation. As such, it makes
essential and invaluable contributions to the maintenance of
the free society.6
The paths of reform are not always clear. Decision makers
are confronted with difficult policy choices. The key competing
social policies are the protection of the citizenry from both crim-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
4. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
5. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
6. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, REPORT ON POVERTY AND THE ADINIS-
TRATION OF FEDERAL CpIaMIAL JUSTICE 10 (1963).
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inal conduct and police abuse. Both past and present decisions
are usually based upon assumptions of fact which are not sub-
ject to verification. Many of the recent innovations by the Su-
preme Court would have undoubtedly been adopted by the states
had they seriously considered the problems. Thus the states,
through inaction, have seemingly abdicated their role as design-
ers of their destiny to federal regulation. Yet local government
continues to be the more ideal source of reform, since only offi-
cials at that level can be fully aware of the real local needs and
peculiarities. Today one thing is certain: the states must meet
modern conceptions of justice and fairness, either through their
own initiative or by federal mandate.
A brief review of how South Carolina handles some of its crim-
inal procedure problems suggests the great need for new evalua-
tion. The area of police interrogation and arrest is a prime
example. While other states experiment with "stop-and-frisk"
statutes7 to protect the police officer while questioning a dan-
gerous suspect, or "two hour detention" statutes8 for interroga-
tion, South Carolina offers no statutory guide or protection to
its enforcement officers. Antiquated statutes that governed the
related area of search and seizure were recently described as
more restrictive of law enforcement than is required under either
the state or federal constitutions.9 While the police could flout
these rules prior to Mapp v. Ohio,' ° they must now abide by
procedural safeguards or let the criminal go free.
Many lawyers familiar with the value of discovery in civil
litigation would be shocked by the inadequacy of discovery de-
vices in criminal cases. A guilt determining process which fails
to detect and impede surprise, subterfuge and suppression has
poor reliability. The sometimes expressed fears that discovery
leads to perjury and intimidation are for the most part non-
sense." In any event, broad judicial discretion could prevent
most abuse.
12
7. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIMINAL CODE § 180(a).
8. UNIFORm ARREST AcT § 2 (1942). The Uniform Act has been adopted
in four states. PAULSON & KADISH, CRImINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 832
(1962).
9. For an excellent discussion of the South Carolina search and seizure law,
see Note, Search and Seizure-A Constitutional Standard for South Carolina,
17 S.C.L. REv. 687, 706-16 (1965). The search and seizure rules have been
recently classified and liberalized by the South Carolina legislature. S.C. AcTs
&J. RES. 907 (1966).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Crininal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1193-94 (1960).
12. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 56, 99-101 (1961).
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Many other areas need reconsideration and revision. The exist-
ing bail system is costly and places an unfair burden on the
poor.13 Most of the other problems in criminal law administra-
tion are governed more by bad practice than by sound principles.
There are, in addition, many areas in the South Carolina sub-
stantive criminal law, such as insanity, conspiracy, and theft,
that are illogical and unsuitable for handling modern criminal
problems.
The Defense of Indigents Act is a giant step forward toward
solution of the most critical problem in the criminal administra-
tion field. Gideon v. Wainiwright14 has made it clear that counsel
for the defense is just as vital a part of the adversary system
as the judge or the prosecutor. Without counsel the other safe-
guards are usually ineffectual. Thus, this proposal, which at-
tempts to implement Gideon, is especially worthy of analysis
and comment.
B. Determination of Indigeney
Section 16 places the responsibility of investigating and de-
termining indigency upon the defense administrator. Suppose
a suspect has only 200 dollars, which will probably be needed
for investigation expenses? Suppose he has only a car worth
200 dollars, which he uses to transport himself to and from
work? Suppose he has a wife and children who are dependent
solely upon him for support? Judge Prettyman has raised fur-
ther questions:
But suppose that, although he has no ready cash, he has a
good job. Or suppose he has assets such as a car, a television
set or a refrigerator. Suppose he has a good job and some
cash but has a wife and children. Suppose he has no readily
convertible asset but has an equity in a home. Suppose he
has in his pocket a hundred dollars but owns not another
sou. Suppose he earns plenty but spends more and so is
always in debt. Suppose he has nothing himself but has a
wealthy father, a thrifty brother, or a kindly employer or
friend. Suppose he can make no present payment but could
13. The South Carolina bail system, in its present form, may violate due
process. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail-Part Two, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 1125, 1180-85 (1965). In any event, there is no good reason
why a more enlightened system cannot be adopted. For recommendations see
LaFaye, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. Ii.. LAF. 8.
14. Supra note 1.
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make a satisfactory installment arrangement. Suppose he
cannot pay a fee commensurate with the service needed but
could pay a small proportion of it. Suppose his wife works
and really supports the family and is willing, if need be, to
shoulder the burden of his defense even though for what
reason no objective observer can discern. The fact is there
are no authoritative, or generally accepted, standards for
evaluating indigency for these purposes. There is no guide-
book for determining when, under a variety of financial cir-
cumstances, the community should supply legal service with-
out cost to a person accused of crime.15
Section 16 does not attempt answers. The administrator is
given total discretion as to whether an alleged indigent is quali-
fied to receive appointed counsel. Practice will probably vary
from county to county, but inflexible standards would produce
greater evil. "Poverty must be viewed as a relative concept." 6
However, section 16 could have provided some guidance with-
out creating arbitrary results. For example, the administrator
should uniformly take into account family obligations when
determining whether counsel should be assigned, or how much
the accused should be required to contribute toward his defense.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has been granted authority
in section 6 to formulate such implementing standards.
As a practical approach to the problem of determining indi-
gency, counsel should probably be appointed whenever a person
claims inability to pay. If the administrator denies appoint-
ment and the defendant fails to obtain counsel on his own, the
trial would be suspect: an otherwise valid conviction would
hinge upon the administrator's decision. In addition, any ex-
tensive examination of individual cases will be expensive, and
automatic appointment would reduce the need for such investi-
gations. A further restraint is the fact that a judgment can be
obtained against the person for defense counsel fees and other
expenses. Of course, this approach would be misused and it may
be wise legislative policy to permit the investigation and refusal
of counsel as a check against abuse.
15. Prettyman, Problem of thw Indigent-Three Modern Problems in Crim-
inal Law, 18 WAsH. & LaE L. REv. 187, 212 (1961).
16. ATrortNEY GENERAL's ComHiTTEE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 7.
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C. Assignment
Section 1 states that when a person is charged with a crime,
he shall be advised of his right to counsel. Does this mean that
the police must advise an accused of his right to counsel immedi-
ately upon arrest? Or must there first be a formal charge by
indictment before he is so advised? Is he to be advised by a
policeman, magistrate or by the defense administrator?
The proposed act does not provide for a required procedure.
This silence is perhaps justified on the grounds that due process
standards are too uncertain at present for the adoption of spe-
cific rules. Section 6 gives the South Carolina Supreme Court
authority to establish the procedure. This task should be con-
siderably less difficult in the near future. The United States
Supreme Court has heard several cases involving these and other
points raised in Esco)edo and it has been widely predicted that
the Court is prepared to clarify the constitutional minimum.17
The present South Carolina practice of waiting until arraign-
ment before counsel is appointed is probably unconstitutional.
The accused is usually in jail for months awaiting trial. During
this interval his rights to bail, counsel and protection against
self-incrimination are often suspended. Escobedo has already
embraced the principles that "the time a defendant needs coun-
sel most is immediately after arrest" and "representation must
be provided early if it is to be effective."' 8 It is unlikely that
the Court will radically depart from this philosophy.
Section 1 also provides that if the accused requests counsel and
is determined to be indigent, counsel will be appointed. The
appointment of counsel is seemingly conditioned upon the de-
fendant's request. Persons suffering from mental illness may
not be able to meet this prerequisite. Others, through ignorance,
may remain silent. Does silence constitute automatic waiver?
This unnecessary ambiguity should be clarified by amendment.
Section 4 requires waiver of the right to counsel to be a written,
affirmative act. Counsel should be immediately appointed in all
cases except where the person has executed a written waiver.
Under section I the possibility of a six months' sentence deter-mines whether a person is automatically entitled to appointed
17. See TimE, April 27, 1966, pp. 52-65.
18. Supra note 2. For discussions of the present South Carolina laws on
when the right to counsel begins see Myers, Criminal Law and Procedure, 17
S.C.L. REv. 37-40 (1966); Comment, 17 S.C.L. Rxv. 741 (1965).
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counsel. The court retains discretion to appoint counsel to de-
fend a person against lesser charges. The six months' standard
has the advantage of being workable-whether fair may depend
upon whether the courts are willing to appoint counsel to defend
against questionable prosecutions when minor offenses are in-
volved.
The bill's proposal may profitably be compared with the fed-
eral standard. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that:
"In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with
a felony or misdemeanor, other than a petty offense," he shall
be advised that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he
is financially unable to obtain counsel. 19 What constitutes a
petty offense depends upon the nature of the offense. The crime
of reckless driving, which carried a maximum sentence of thirty
days or 100 dollars fine, could not be classified as a petty offense
because it was an act of obvious depravity.20 Yet the regulatory
crime of dealing in second-hand books without a license is a
petty offense, even though punishable by a maximum sentence
of ninety days or 300 dollars fine.
21
The constitutional requirement is uncertain. In a recent Fifth
Circuit case 22 a guilty plea to an illegal possession of whiskey
charge was reversed because the defendant had not been advised
of his right to assigned counsel. The maximum punishment for
the offense was ninety days. Under this standard even the fed-
eral "petty offense" approach is suspect. Whether the six months'
standard will meet due process criteria cannot be answered and
must await future federal developments.
D. AppeaZ and Habeas Corpus
Indigents who have been convicted and sentenced for at least
six months may have assigned counsel on appeal or for filing a
writ of habeas corpus. Section 8 conditions the right to assigned
counsel upon a finding by the defense administrator that there
is "reasonable justification for the appeal." If he finds that no
reasonable justification exists then he presents the matter to the
court which makes the final determination.
Douglas v. Califo&nia23 extended the right to counsel in crim-
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
20. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
21. District of Columbia v. Clowans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
22. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1965).
23. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
[Vol. 18
29
et al.: The Proposed Defense of Indigents Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
THE PROPOSED DEFENSE OF INDIGENTS ACT
inal cases to appeals. Section 8 is an attempt to meet that stand-
ard. Unfortunately, the qualification of "reasonable justifica-
tion" impairs the effort. Douglas relied upon the Griffim v.
Illinois24 rationale that a state "may not grant appellate review
in such a way as to [discriminate] against some convicted de-
fendants on account of their poverty. 2 5 In Douglas assigned
counsel was denied because the state court "had 'gone through'
the record and had come to the conclusion that 'no good what-
ever could be served by appointment of counsel.' -126 The con-
demned procedure has obvious similarities to the qualification
in section 8.
This opinion is further buttressed by examining Griffin v.
Illinois and its aftermath. In Griffin the Supreme Court held
that the equal protection clause required either furnishing tran-
scripts at state expense to appealing indigents or else liberaliz-
ing its appeal procedure to the point where lack of a transcript
would not, in effect, deny the right to be heard on the merits.
Under Griffin, the indigent's right to a transcript cannot be
conditioned upon a decision by the trial judge that the trial was
fair.2 7 Similarly, the belief by the judge that the appeal would
be frivolous cannot be a basis for denial.28 Section 10, which
provides for transcripts at state expense, is seemingly condi-
tioned upon the appeal meeting the "reasonable justification"
condition of section 8. In any event, since the equal protection
clause prohibits the denial of a transcript on the grounds that
the appeal is determined frivolous, it would also bar the denial
of counsel for like reasons.
Assigned counsel in habeas corpus proceedings is on a differ-
ent footing. In Douglas it was noted:
We are not here concerned with problems that might arise
from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition
for discretionary or mandatory release beyond that stage in
the appellate process in which the claims have once been
presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate
court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted
24. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
25. Id. at 18.
26. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354-55 (1963).
27. See Eskridge v. Washington, 257 U.S. 14 (1958).
28. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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As a matter of right to rich and poor alike from a criminal
conviction.29
Although assigned counsel is not constitutionally required in
habeas corpus cases, section 9a, permitting appointment, is a
very desirable feature of the proposed bill. If the state provides
an unqualified right to counsel on appeal, the requirement of
"reasonable justification" before appointment in habeas corpus
proceedings is not too onerous.
E. Compensation
The most important feature of the proposed act is section 12
which provides for compensation of counsel. I have recently
suggested elsewhere that the state's failure to compensate attor-
neys assigned to indigents is unsatisfactory and may result in
a denial of due process.8 0 Non-compensation is sometimes de-
fended on the grounds that the legal profession is solely respon-
sible for and should finance representation of the poor. The
criminal process however is not initiated by the legal profession
but by government and for the achievement of basic govern-
mental purposes. It is a process which has the potentiality of
imposing the most severe penalties on the persons proceeded
against. Thus government is obligated to strive for a reliable
and fair process. This is, in part, achieved by adequately com-
pensating those who contribute their services toward the ful-
fillment of that obligation."1
Under present South Carolina practice the attorney must not
only gratuitously contribute his services, he is not reimbursed
for out-of-pocket expenses necessary for an adequate defense.
The assigned counsel must pay for such items as fees for doctors
and other professionals, travel expenses of witnesses, and investi-
gators. This obvious inequity could too often result in valuable
but expensive defense evidence being withheld by the suspect's
own counsel. Section 7 offers needed relief by permitting pay-
ment of reasonable expenses. Reimbursement is conditioned
upon a finding by the judge that the expenses are necessary
and reasonable.
29. Supra note 23, at 356.
30. See Myers, Criminal Law and Procedure, 18 S.C.L. REv. 37, 41-42 (1966).
31. Well over ninety percent of the states provide for compensation, thereby
recognizing that indigent representation is a public responsibility. See Silver-
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F. Reimbursement by the Accused
The act does not propose that free legal services be given to
indigents in criminal actions. Recipients must, to the extent of
their ability, pay back any sums expended for their defense.
Section 3a creates a claim against the indigent which may be
reduced to judgment under section 3b. In addition, section 2
and section 16 give the defense administrator power to require
the suspect initially to turn over any available funds. Section 3e
places the ultimate responsibility of handling claims upon the
attorney general.
It does not seem unduly harsh to require indigents found
guilty of crimes to repay expenditures in their behalf. If the
person has been found innocent of the charges and he has
already been required to expend his last assets for his defense,
perhaps he should be relieved of further imposition. This is
possible under section 3d which permits the court to waive,
modify, or withdraw the judgment whenever to do so will pro-
mote justice.
A further difficulty may arise in the administration of the
reimbursement provisions. The defense administrator is not
specifically required to advise the accused that a judgment will
be obtained and that he will be ultimately forced to pay for any
costs. Yet the administrator should and probably will offer
such advice. There is a real danger that the person may feel
that he would rather do without counsel than have a judgment
obtained against him. Particularly if the accused is clearly
guilty, or has confessed, he will not discern the benefits of
counsel. Most defendants are unqualified to judge the value
of counsel. Legal advice is unquestionably of great value in
criminal prosecutions. For example, when the suspect is guilty
and wishes to plead guilty to the crime or crimes charged, a
negotiated guilty plea between the solicitor and defense counsel
will usually result in the ultimate punishment being consider-
ably reduced. The statutory protection offered in the proposed
act is the requirement in section 4 that the written waiver of
counsel must be voluntarily and understandingly made. In prac-
tice the administrator should take great care in completely
informing persons of the importance of counsel.
The South Carolina bail system, in addition to being basically
unfair, aggravates the indigency problem. When a person must
32
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remain in jail during the pre-trial period, his earning power
is interrupted and his inability to pay for defense expenses is
intensified. This is particularly acute when the person has a
family that is dependent upon him for support. In addition, the
state must pay for his maintenance during this period of incar-
ceration. An enlightened pre-trial release program should con-
siderably reduce the public costs.
G. Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 15 permits counties to join together and adopt a plan
which must be approved by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
This provision should result in cost advantages and create ad-
ministrative ease.
Section 16 allows counties to utilize a public defender. Al-
though public defender systems have been sharply criticized,
they have proved workable and less costly in some states.
3 2
Without exploring the pros and cons, it is desirable that each
county have the flexibility to adopt the plan that most nearly
satisfies its needs.
Section 5 requires the trial judge to investigate the plea of
guilty and determine that it "was freely, understandably and
voluntarily made without undue influence, compulsion or duress,
and without promise of leniency." This provision is an excellent
check on potential abuse that might arise from negotiated pleas.
There is little doubt that some assigned counsel will not act in
their client's interests. They may become quite forceful in their
efforts to have the suspect plead guilty, but with the trial judge
closely examining the guilty plea, this danger is minimized.
H. Conclusion
The proposed bill is a laudable piece of legislation. Any
criticisms are minor and the flaws easily corrected. Several
areas are uncertain, but the South Carolina Supreme Court,
under section 6, has the full power to adopt clarifying rules and
regulations. The act is worthy and South Carolina needs the act.
32. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of Defender systems,
see SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 39-74 (1965). Defender systems have
proved satisfactory in several states. See, e.g., Cuff, The Public Defender
System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. REv. 715 (1961); Kamisar &
Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 109-16 (1963).
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